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" And for their beating giving thanks,
" They rais'd recruits, and fill'd their banks."
HUDIBRAS.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

BATTLE OF TALAVERA.——When writing upon this subject, in my last Number, little did I imagine, that we should *so soon* hear of the retreat of our "*victorious*" army; and still less, that the General, who commanded it, and who had, of course, led it into such a perilous situation, would, in good earnest, be made a peer on account of that "victory." The hireling prints had, indeed, asserted, that he was to be peered; but, still, I could not believe it. The next day, however, when I came to see the "GENERAL ORDERS," issued, by the Commander in Chief, to the army, and dated on the 8th of August; when I came to see this extraordinary and *unprecedented* document, I began to think, that the hirelings were correct, and that it really was intended to make SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY a peer; but, even then, how was I to believe it possible, that he was to be made a *viscount*?——Let us, before we proceed any further with our own remarks, take a look at this singular ORDER, which, as the reader will not fail to perceive, was at once, an Order to the Army, and a sort of Declaration to the People.——I shall *number* the paragraphs for the sake of reference. ——" I. The Commander in Chief has received THE KING'S COMMANDS to notify to the army the *splendid victory* obtained by his troops in Spain, under the command of Lieutenant-General the Right Honourable Sir Arthur Wellesley, on the 27th and 28th of last month, at the battle of Talavera de la Reyna.—— II. His Majesty is confident that his army will learn with becoming exultation, that the enemy, after *escaping by a precipitate retreat*, from the well-concerted attack with which Sir Arthur Wellesley, in conjunction with the Spanish army, had threatened him on the 24th of July, concentrated his force, by calling to his aid the corps under the French General Sebastiani, and the garrison of Madrid; and thus reinforced, again approached the allied army on the 27th of July; and, on this occasion, owing to the local circumstances of its position, and to the deliberate purpose of the enemy *to direct his whole efforts against the troops of his Majesty*, the British army sustained *nearly the whole weight of this great contest*, and has acquired the glory of having *vanquished a French army double their numbers*, not in a short and partial struggle, but in a battle obstinately contested on two successive days (not wholly discontinued even throughout the intervening night) and fought under circumstances which brought both armies into close and repeated combat. ——III. The King, in contemplating so glorious a display of the valour and prowess of his troops, has been graciously pleased to command that his royal approbation of the conduct of the army serving under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Wellesley shall be thus publicly declared in General Orders.——IV. The Commander in Chief has received the King's commands to signify, *in the most marked and special manner*, the sense his Majesty entertains of Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Wellesley's *personal services* on this memorable occasion, not less displayed *in the result* of the battle itself, than in the consummate *ability, valour*, and *military resource*, with which the many difficulties of this arduous and protracted contest were met, and provided for, by his experience and judgment.——V. The conduct of Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke, second in command, has entitled him to the King's marked approbation. His Majesty has observed with satisfaction the manner in which he led on the troops to the charge with the bayonet, a species of combat, which on all occasions so well accords with the dauntless character of British soldiers.——VI. His Majesty has noticed with the same gracious approbation, the conduct of the several General and other Officers.—All have done their duty; most of them have had occasions of eminently distinguishing

" themselves, the instances of which have " not escaped his Majesty's attention.—— " VII. It is his Majesty's command, that " his royal approbation and thanks shall " be given in the most distinct and most " particular manner, to the non-commis- " sioned officers and private men. In no " instance have they displayed with greater " lustre their native valour and character- " istic energy, nor have they on any " former occasion more decidedly proved " their superiority over the inveterate ene- " my of their country.——VIII. Brilliant, " however, as is the victory obtained at " Talavera, it is not solely on that occa- " sion that Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur " Wellesley, and the troops under his com- " mand, are entitled to his Majesty's ap- " plause. The important service effected " in an early part of the campaign by the " same army, under the command of the " same *distinguished* General, by the rapid " march on the Duero, the passage of that " river, the *total discomfiture of the enemy,* " and his expulsion from the territory of " one of his Majesty's ancient and most " faithful allies, are circumstances which " have made a lasting impression on his " Majesty's mind; and have induced his " Majesty to direct, that *the operations of* " *this arduous and eventful campaign shall be* " *thus recorded,* as furnishing splendid ex- " amples of military skill, fortitude, perse- " verance, and of a spirit of enterprize " calculated to produce emulation in every " part of his army, and largely to add to " the renown, and to the military charac- " ter of the British nation."——Now, though all this is said in his Majesty's name, I shall consider it, as we do a Speech from the throne, to be the words of his ministers, or advisers, be they who they may; and, so considering it, I shall, without the least reserve, proceed to make it a subject of commentary.——Paragraph II. is first to be considered in a grammatical point of view. What does it *mean* then? " The king is confident, that his army will " learn with *becoming exultation,*" *what?* What is he confident, that they will learn with becoming exultation? Why, first, " that the enemy concentrated his forces, " by calling to his aid the corps under the " French General Sebastiani and the gar- " rison of Madrid." Really, there does not appear, in this, any great ground for *exultation.* Well, but, secondly, they will learn with exultation, that " thus rein- " forced, the enemy approached the allied " army on the 27th of July." Here again does not seem to be much ground for exultation. Come, then, what next? Why 3rdly, they will learn with becoming exultation, that, on this occasion, owing to local and other circumstances, " the " British army sustained nearly the whole " of this great contest." Still, what ground is there for *exultation?* At last comes the fact of the victory, and that, supposing it to be correct, is a ground for exultation; but, the paragraph, taken altogether, is a confused mass of words having no definite meaning; or, rather, having, when it comes to be examined, a meaning that is grossly absurd.——The *facts,* however, of this paragraph, are of much more consequence than the grammar of it. First it states, that the enemy, that is to say, the French army, under Marshal Victor (the Duke of Belluno) had, on the 24th of July, " *escaped* by a *precipi-* " *tate retreat* from a well-concerted attack, " with which sir Arthur Wellesley had " threatened him."—— Let us bear in mind this word *escape.* Let us bear in mind, that, when the French do not wait 'till we come up with them, his Majesty is said to call it an *escape* on the part of the French. When pursued, and not stopping to accept of offered battle, the French *escape:* mind that, because we shall have to view situations of this sort on both sides, I am afraid. Well, then, the French *escaped?* They escaped, too, it seems, from " *a well-concerted attack?*" Who *knows* that? Who told the king that? His Ministers? How did they come by the knowledge? Sir Arthur told them so, perhaps; but, where is the *proof* of it? Where is the proof, that the attack was " *well*-concerted?" The usual proof of a well-concerted attack is the *defeat of the enemy;* but, in this case, there was not only no defeat, but there was no battle; there was, in fact, *no attack* at all; the attack never had any existence but in idea and intention. At this rate meritorious services can never be wanting to any man, who has interest enough to get himself appointed to a command. He has only to tell you, that, on such a day, he *intended* to perform such or such an exploit, but that, from some circumstance or other, he was prevented from fulfilling his intention. " The gallant sir Arthur," in the present case, intended to attack the Duke of Belluno, but the Duke of Belluno would not let him. " The gallant sir Arthur" failed in his project; the project did not succeed; and, good souls, we are

to believe, that it was delightfully "*well-concerted!*" As the Duke of Brunswick is reported to have said, we are *a good-natured people!* Like the Catamaran and the Carr project, it *failed;* but it was *well-concerted.*——The next fact, stated in this paragraph, under the authority of the King's name, is, that, "owing to the *de-* "*liberate* purpose of the enemy to direct "his *whole efforts* against the troops of his "Majesty, the British army sustained "*nearly the whole weight of this great con-* "*test.*"——Something like this was said by sir Arthur Wellesley in his dispatch; but, this the Spanish general's reports to his government deny. He claims, for himself and his army, a full share of the "victory." General CUESTA issues his "*Orders*" as well as we; but as to the feats of the battle, they differ very materially from ours. We say, that "the British army "sustained nearly the whole weight of "the contest." *Nearly the whole* can leave to the Spaniards but very little indeed; scarcely any; and, especially when we consider the delicacy, which, *one would think*, must have been felt by the English ministry, when writing and proclaiming upon such a subject. Well, then, what says Cuesta in *his* Orders to *his* army?——"Soldiers of the Army of Estrema- "dura! On the 27th and 28th days of "July *you fought* bravely; *you* repeated- "ly *repulsed the enemy*, who was compelled "to fly, leaving the field of battle covered "with his dead; this glorious victory is "due to *your* firmness and union, to *your* "incessant and *well-supported fire*, and to "confidence in *your* Officers and Chiefs; "if you always observe the same, you "will always be invincible. The French "troops are not men except where they "find no resistance; that which they "met with in the valiant English troops, "our Allies, routed and put them to "flight. We know that the French sol- "diers now refuse to enter into action "after seeing their best troops destroyed. "—Soldiers! I am satisfied with *your* va- "lour and firmness; I congratulate you "on *your* triumph, and I rely on your union "and discipline. I do not call Soldiers, "nor consider as a part of the army, those "base cowards who abandoned their regi- "ments on the days of battle, *flying in the* "*moment of danger*, and with the design of "producing disorder; such wretches, be- "sides the infamy which covers them, "shall be *decimated* as soon as they are "apprehended."——Now, does this Order contain gross and most impudent falsehoods? Is it a tissue of bragging and lies? Doubtless not; but, then, how are we to account for the language of sir Arthur Wellesley, and that of the above-quoted Order, from which it manifestly would appear, that the Spaniards had *no share in the battle worth mentioning?* I put it to the reader, whether this be not the plain meaning of those documents; whether they be not so understood? And, if this be so, what are we to think, when we compare them with the Order of Cuesta? Which are we to believe?——Cuesta, in his official letter to the Spanish government, dated on the 29th of July, says: "The Spanish troops, and especially "those which *had the greatest share* in the "action, left me nothing to wish for with "respect to their courage and gallantry. "*The fierce and well supported fire of our in-* "*fantry repulsed the repeated attacks of the* "*enemy;* and the *charges of our cavalry* "caused them much loss. The King's "regiment has, in particular, covered it- "self with glory; and in conjunction with "the English *took several pieces of cannon*, "and *made prisoners* a *General*, a *Colonel*, "and *several Officers:* and I request that "its Colonel, Brigadier Don Joseph Maria "de Lastres, may be promoted to the "rank of Lieutenant-General, for having "attacked at the head of his regiment, "giving the best example."——Thus, you see, that, as we proceed our difficulties increase. To *reconcile* our publications with those of the Spanish General is a task, I should fear, too much even for Messrs. Huskisson and Ward, or, for Lord Castlereagh himself.——Here the Spanish General, in an official report, which he knew would be published, and be read by the English army, talks of those of his troops, who had "the *greatest* share" in the action; of the *fierce and well-supported fire* of his infantry; of their *repeatedly repulsing* the attacks of the enemy; and of the *charges of his cavalry*. Could there be all this, and yet Sir Arthur speak of the Spanish assistance in the manner that he does?——But, what shall we say to the concluding part of this paragraph of Cuesta? He gives to his troops a share, not to say the *principal* share, in *taking the cannon*, which fell into our hands, and of which Sir Arthur Wellesley speaks as having been taken by his troops, without any particular mention of the Spaniards; nay, CUESTA here talks of PRISONERS, whom his army assisted in taking, and amongst whom were "a *Ge-*

" *neral*, a *Colonel*, and *several officers.*" How is all this? We heard, through Sir Arthur Wellesley, of no officers of the *enemy* being made prisoner. He drily told us; quite drily, that he had made " *some* pri- " soners;" but, not a word does he say about the *number* of them; much less about their *rank*, though he had plenty of time for all this before the 1st of August, when, it seems, he wrote his last dispatches. Is it possible, that Cuesta was humming the Junta? Is it possible, that he should put such a barefaced falshood in black-and-white? I think not; and, yet, how can we reconcile his statement with either the language, or the *silence*, of Sir Arthur Wellesley?——Upon the whole, however, as to the part, which the Spaniards had in the action, it is impossible that *both* accounts can be true; and, as long as this impossibility exists, I shall continue, not to doubt, but to disbelieve, the fact, that, on the 27th and 28th of July, our army had to contend *with double its numbers*. In plain English, I do not believe that fact. I believe, that our army had to contend with *superior* numbers, because I do not believe, that, with equal numbers, the French would have attacked them; but, including the Spanish army under Cuesta, which, *before* the battle, was stated at 52,000 men, we had double the numbers of the French, according to the report of Cuesta himself, who states the French force at from 35,000 to 40,000 men, which is not contradicted by Wellesley, who gives no statement at all of the French force.——The aid we got from the Spaniards, was, I dare say, not great; but, it must have been *something*; and, as the force of Wellesley, before the battle, was stated here at 26,000 men, the disparity in point of numbers, actually engaged, could not have been so very great. Still, I am convinced, that we had to contend with superior numbers, actually engaged; and, I am, for my part, quite satisfied with that, without any exaggerations of any sort.——But, who that rightly considers the matter, and that has viewed the *result* of this battle, can possibly approve of the word " *vanquished*" as applied to the French army at Talavera? This army was *repulsed*, at the most; it was merely a repulse; at the very most, it was nothing more. To *vanquish* is more than to *defeat*; it is to *subdue*; and, is it modest, is it decent, for us to say, that we subdued the French at Talavera? We lose greatly; we greatly injure our character by these exaggerations. The account of the contending forces, published in our news-papers no longer ago than the 9th of August, said: " On the 8th of July Cuesta was at " Miravete, and Sir Arthur Wellesley at " Placentia; there was to be an interview " between them on the 9th, and we con- " clude the junction was effected on the " 11th or 12th. The French, under Vic- " tor, were, on the 7th, at Talavera; they " are repairing that bridge. By a letter " from Victor to King Joseph, dated Oro- " pera, the 25th of June, and taken by a " party of our horse beyond Talavera, *his* " *army appears to have been in a sad condi-* " *tion* at that time, though not so bad as " that of Soult, in Old Castile, whose let- " ters, taken on General Franceschi, draw " a *deplorable picture of that division of Van-* " *dals.*" These were the accounts, with which the people of England were amused but a very few days before the news of the battle arrived. *Now*, it seems, however, that VICTOR had an army of sufficient force to *attack* the united Spanish and English army, which, if the last accounts be correct, is retreating before the " *vanquished*" army of Victor; yes, retreating, absolutely retreating, before that very army, which it " vanquished" at Talavera, and *for having vanquished* which our general commanding is, in future, to bear the title of *Viscount of Talavera!* Aye; that is the way that *we* do things!——Oh! but our army is not getting away from the Duke of Belluno's alone; there is Soult, the " *cursed* " Soult" (the Duke of Dalmatia) pushing across from Placentia, to take us in front, while the Duke of Belluno comes upon our rear. Sure! What, Soult, the " cursed " Soult," with his " division of Vandals," who, only on the 9th of August, we were told were in so " *deplorable*" a state, and which division was, we were before told, reduced to 4,000 men! All this, if not very wonderful, ought to teach the people of England to shut their ears against the statements of these hireling writers, whose calling it is to deceive and to cheat them.—— It will be remembered too, that it is for having *defeated* this same " cursed Soult," on the river Douro, in Portugal, that the title of *Baron Douro* has been given to Wellesley. The titles are thus:——" The " King has been pleased to grant the dig- " nities of Baron and Viscount of the " United Kingdoms of Great Britain and " Ireland, unto the Right Hon. Sir Arthur " Wellesley, Knight of the Most Honour- " able Order of the Bath, and Lieutenant " General of his Majesty's Forces, and to

"the heirs male of his body lawfully be-
"gotten, by the names, styles, and titles of
"Baron Douro of Wellesley, in the county
"of Somerset, and Viscount Wellington of
"Talavera, and of Wellington, in the said
"county," and the GENERAL ORDER, upon which we are observing, and which appears to have been intended principally for the purpose of preparing the public mind for the grant of the titles; this ORDER says, that, upon the DOURO, Sir Arthur Wellesley "*totally discomfited* the enemy." Mr. Whitbread, with political courage possessed by very few, observed in parliament, that it was not a battle with Soult's *army*, but merely with his *rear guard*. At any rate, we *now* are told, that it is this totally discomfited force, this division of Vandals in the most deplorable state, of whom Baron Douro is so much afraid, that he is getting off as fast as possible towards Cadiz. We are a good-natured people, as the Duke of Brunswick says; a remarkably believing people; a people whose faith puts to shame that of the worshippers of the Dutch Dolls.——Some people seem to be of opinion, that Baron Douro of Wellesley, in the county of Somerset, and Viscount Wellington of Talavera de la Reyna, and of Wellington in the said county, is in imminent danger of being captured with all his army. This is an apprehension expressed in the news-papers, upon what foundation I know not; but, if it should be well-founded, and the event take place, there surely will be no end to the laughter and mockeries of the French and of all Europe. We shall, indeed, pass for able deliverers, if this should be the case; if the man, who bears the title of places where he has "vanquished" one army and "totally discomfited" another, should be captured, with all his army, by one or both of those same armies, even before his titles get out to him! Things can hardly be so bad as this. I do not see, as yet, any reason to fear a result at once so melancholy and so ludicrous; but, if the accounts from Spain be true, he was, when the last advices came away, *retreating* as fast as possible before that very army, for having "*vanquished*" which he is titled, and had started, on his retreat, from the very spot, the name of which he and his descendants are to bear. This, without any thing more, is a curious fact, and quite characteristic of the times in which we live, and of the use which is now made of honours and titles.——The GENERAL ORDER expresses, in the most marked and special manner, the sense which the king entertains of the *personal* services of sir Arthur Wellesley, and speaks highly of his *ability*, *valour*, and *military resource*, displayed *during this eventful campaign*.—Now, in the first place, the campaign is *not yet over*; and, though I shall pass no opinion upon the *valour* of Baron Douro and Viscount Talavera, 'till I possess something like a knowledge of its existence, I shall not restrain myself from saying, that, during the campaign, as far as I have heard any thing of it, I have discovered no marks of *ability*, or *military resource*, in the Viscount; and, if those who advised the GENERAL ORDER, had thought it a fit occasion to make a grateful allusion to those with whose blood the defence at Talavera was purchased, to glance at the 653 officers and men and the 159 horses, *missing*, and to hint at the subsequent retreat of our army, they would, I imagine, have found it necessary to cite some *proof* of the ability and military resource of the Viscount, other than that to be found in the history of this "eventful campaign."——Why did he not pursue the "vanquished" enemy? He wanted *provisions* and *rest*; and did not Victor want them too? This excuse will never do. It is well known, that a retreating army always experiences more suffering in this way than a pursuing army. But, why did he not wait for provisions? Why did he push on in such a manner as to put it out of his power to pursue the enemy, though he should beat him? Why did he so manage matters as to be unable to pursue a vanquished enemy? Pursue did I say? Nay, to be *unable to keep his ground* before a *vanquished enemy!* Good heaven; to be unable to stay and *look a vanquished enemy in the face!* "He thought, that Victor would not be so "strong as he was." Oh; he did, did he? Why, then, he thought wrong, and a man, who is entrusted with the lives of other men and with the honour of his country, should not think wrong. "Any man may "make a mistake." Very true; but, it is not the luck of every man to receive thereupon greater honours, or, at least, a *higher title*, than was bestowed upon the *Hero of the Nile*.——The hireling writers in London appear, from the following paragraph, to be disposed to maintain, that the Viscount intended to pursue and to fight Victor with an inferior army, *knowing* that Soult was in his (the Viscount's) rear, with an army equal in numbers to his own. ——"Come, all you who are so fond of

"considering every thing as so wisely "planned, and so well executed, on the "part of the enemy! who can find no "terms sufficiently strong to express your "admiration of Buonaparté and his gene- "rals, come and behold a contrast!— "Compare the achievements of four "French Marshals with the achievements "of *one British General!* Behold, on one "side, under one of Buonaparté's best "Marshals, between 40 and 50,000 men "advancing against *the British General* in "front, and, on the other, three Marshals, "equally celebrated, Ney, Soult, and "Mortier, advancing with 20,000 in his "rear—*a total force of* 70,000 *men!* To "have merely effected a retreat would "have been thought a singular merit; but "the British General, confident in the "British hearts and arms which he com- "manded, *risks a battle* with more than "double his force, and gains a brilliant "victory; disappoints the project of plac- "ing him between two fires, and *effects his* "*retreat in the best order.*"——Do not "hollow before you are out of the wood," is an old saying. The retreat, in the best order, is not yet *effected*, that we know of; and, if it should be, what could possibly justify the act, which these parasites, these brutally ignorant parasites, impute to the general, whom they think they are praising? To suppose, that, while he was pursuing Victor, he did *not* know the extent of Victor's force, and the extent and local situation of Soult's force; to suppose this is, indeed, to suppose him greatly deficient in point of intelligence; but, to suppose, that he *did* possess this knowledge, is to suppose him guilty of something very little short of treason, unless you set him down for an ideot.——I will not here dwell upon the baseness and impudence of these hirelings, who, to answer their own mercenary purposes, choose to represent the British army as being alone, and to have but *one* general; nor will I stop to notice the acknowledgment of the existence of a French army in Spain to the amount of 70,000 men, when, only three weeks ago, the people were told, by these same writers, that, in a few months, there would not be a Frenchman in the Peninsula; I shall leave these things for the present; but, I cannot refrain from saying another word or two upon the subject of the Viscount's ability and "mili- "tary resource," during this "eventful "campaign."——This "*military resource*" is an unmeaning, coxcomical phrase, taking its rise, amongst most of our other despicable fooleries, in the enervating and stupifying air of St. James's and Bond-street, where our heroes have so many times defeated, routed, and "*vanquished*" the French; but, the meaning it is intended to convey is, I suppose, that which used to be expressed by the word *generalship;* and, taking it in this sense, all I have further to dispute is the *fact*. I should be glad to hear any one state the grounds, upon which it has thus, in the face of the world, been proclaimed, that Wellesley has shewn great generalship, during this campaign. I should like to hear the grounds of this assertion stated; but, I never shall; for those who have made it are not apt to trouble themselves with grounds.——Viscount Talavera and Baron Douro was not sent out until Napoleon had withdrawn the greater part of his troops from the Peninsula. How many times have we been told, that the French were upon the point of entire expulsion? But, at any rate, Talavera had a force superior to the French in Portugal; he pursued the French out of Portugal; and, he, at last, formed a junction with a large Spanish army. Having done this, he (supposing him now to be the directing head and animating soul of every thing near him, which is the supposition we are taught to proceed upon) set forth in pursuit of the army under Victor. No matter, for the present, what Victor's strength was; Baron Douro *pursued* him; and, after some time spent in the pursuit, he *caught* him. The consequence was a battle, in which, taking all for gospel, the French were "*vanquished.*" Well, what happened now? Why, in the first place, the Baron lost one *fourth* part of his army, and about an *eighth* part of that loss consisted of *missing*. Aye, of *missing!* though he kept, he says, the field of battle. Aye, this "vanquished" enemy ran away; not only took themselves off, but took off 653 of our officers and soldiers, and 159 of our horses, along with them. If this was not *catching a Tartar*, never did Pat catch a Tartar in the world. "I have *caught* a "Tartar," said he to his Captain, during a rencontre in the dark. "Well done, "my boy," said the Captain, "bring "him hither."—"He *won't come*," says Pat; "Why, then," said the Captain, "come hither yourself."—"But he *won't* "*let me*," replied Pat, as our 653 officers and soldiers must have replied, if they had been addressed in the same way.——Very

well; but, let us, in spite of this most glaring fact, allow Victor to have been "*vanquished,*" what was the *consequence;* what effect upon the state of the war was produced? For, where every fourth man of an army is lost; where victory is purchased so dearly, it ought to answer some purpose beyond that of procuring a title, and a pension, most likely, for the Commander. What, then, was the *consequence* of this battle? Did it tend to drive the French out of the heart of Spain, where it was fought? Did it shake Joseph Napoleon upon his throne at Madrid? Did it enable our army to pursue and destroy that of France; that which it had "*vanquished*"? No, none of these; but, on the contrary, if the last published advices be correct, our army, was unable to pursue the "vanquished," even for the purpose of recovering its missing; and, in two days after the Battle was fought, it was compelled to retreat before that vanquished army, some of whose generals it had killed and some wounded, and "entire *brigades*" of which it had annihilated! Observe, the French army could have received *no augmentation* after the battle; no succours after it was "vanquished;" because Talavera tells us in his dispatch, that Joseph Napoleon had come out with his troops to Victor's assistance, and that the whole of the French force in this part of Spain was collected together for this battle. The French army could not, therefore, be augmented. It was the very same "vanquished" army, which had been so cut to pieces, and cowed down but two days before. This army it was, before which our "victorious" army began its retreat, in less than 48 hours after its "*glorious* victory." This is pretty *fruit* of victory. It was different at Blenheim and at Trafalgar. This *fruit* was hardly worth the lives of about 5,000 men.——If the French army, which had been "*vanquished*" only 48 hours before, had not, then, received any reinforcements, what made it either prudent or honourable to retreat before it? I should first ask, why it was not *pursued;* but, that has been anticipated by the Baron's dispatch of the 1st of August, where he attributes his inactivity to *want of provisions* and *to fatigue.* Now, as to provisions, why did he go on beyond his provisions. Had he been the pursued party indeed, the excuse might have been good; but, being the pursuer, he had to choose his distances. But, if he wanted provisions, was not the enemy in the same plight? And, as to *fatigue,* oh! it will never do to tell us, that an army, which has "vanquished" another, and annihilated "*entire brigades,*" is unable, from *fatigue,* to pursue that "vanquished" army. This will never do. It is what never was before heard of. And, besides, there were the Spaniards, who, according to the Baron's account, had had little share in the battle, and who could know no other fatigue than what arose from want of something to do. ——This is all nothing, however, till we see the French, see the "vanquished" French, in spite of all the slaughter they had experienced, in spite of the killing and wounding of their generals, and the 87 waggons of wounded men, which Cuesta says they had; till we see them, in spite of all this, coming again to the attack, and actually taking up the ground of our army, which now thinks proper to retreat before them with Talavera at its head. Yes, we see this same "vanquished" army becoming the assailant of those, who, only 48 hours before had obtained a "*glorious* victory" over it; and, not only that, but we see this French army coming on over that very country, where *ours* could find *no provisions!* This is wonderful. If ours could not advance for want of provisions, how is the French army to live, in the same country, and upon the same line of march, and that, too, after our army has passed over it again; after our army has given it another bite down? Want of provisions prevents us from moving forward after a "vanquished" army; but the "vanquished" army is not prevented from moving forward after us, even into the country, where we experience this debilitating and benumbing want of provisions. ——But, there is given us another reason for Talavera's retreat, more powerful than the former; for, indeed, to plead *want of provisions* and *fatigue* in justification of a precipitate *retreat* would be too barefaced even for the meridian of St. James's Street. This other reason is, that SOULT, whom the Spaniards appear to have surnamed "the *cursed,*" was pushing on, with an army of 20,000 men, in order to get upon the rear of Baron Douro; and, that, in order to avoid being placed between two fires, the Baron was compelled to hurry back, though this movement was accompanied with the mortification of seeing himself pursued by an army, that he had "vanquished." This is a very good reason for retreating; and I am not a little pleased to perceive, that, though *want* of

provisions, and *fatigue*, prevented the allied armies from *advancing*, it had no such effect upon their powers of *retreating*, in which, indeed, the two armies appear, from the reports in the news-papers, to have carried their rivalship in zeal to a very high degree. So far from standing in an attitude to thrust each other on foremost, they appear, if these accounts be true, to have thought of nothing but excelling one another in alacrity. It would seem, that our army was willing to take the lead, and to leave the Spaniards to *come after at their leisure*; but whether from that *affection* for our army, which the Morning Chronicle supposes to have been so strong, or, from some other cause, not less delicate and more powerful, it does appear, that our army was hardly got out of sight, when the Spaniards set off after it, like a foal after its dam.——Be this as it may, the reason for the retreat is quite sufficient; and, it only remains for my Lord Douro, or some of those who talk of his "*military resource*," to furnish as good a reason for the advance of our army to Talavera, while "the cursed Soult" lay at Placentia; or while he lay any where, he or any other French commander, with a force capable, when joined to that of Victor, or co-operating with Victor's force, to place our army between two fires, and possibly to capture it. We want a sufficient reason for this. The advance into the heart of Spain has lost us many thousand of lives; it has sent some hundreds of our countrymen into French prisons, there to remain, perhaps, for several years; it will cost us many a hundred thousand of pounds; and shall we not be entitled to ask, *why* it was undertaken; especially when the commander is asserted to have displayed great generalship, and when he is loaded with titles for his achievements? Was he not acquainted with the strength, or the situation, of "the cursed Soult's" army? *Why*, then, was he not? It is one part, and a material part, of generalship to know what and whom you have to attack or to defend yourself against. Either Talavera knew what he had to encounter, or he did not: if the former, he wanted the judgment necessary to enable him to weigh his means against his undertaking; and if the latter, he ought not to have advanced. In short, the advance into Spain and on to Talavera was of his own choosing: there was nothing that compelled him to leave Portugal: he was safe in his rear, had an abundance of means for keeping his ground, and, of course, should not have moved forward till he had been able to form a rational hope of success. The advance was his own work; no one else had any thing to do with it; and, if it end in a flight before the French, after having cost us so much in blood and in money, shall we still be told, that he has great "*military resource?*" Shall we still patiently hear this? Shall we still shout when the Park and Tower guns are fired? Shall we, indeed, verify the words of my motto? And, yet, shall we have the impudence, the inane assurance, to mock at the French people on account of their credulity?——When I take a view of the Battle of Talavera, I can see in it no marks of generalship on the part of Wellesley; but, of his conduct during that battle we can, in fact, *know* very little. We *know* what his conduct in the *campaign* has been, as far as it has hitherto gone; that is to say, the campaign considered as consisting of important movements and measures; and, if we find him wanting in these; if we find these movements and measures productive of loss of ground as well as loss of lives and money, our decision must be against the generalship of the campaign.—— There is one, and, in my opinion, but one ground of apology for the advance of our army into Spain, so far as Talavera: I mean, that Douro did not find either the Spanish *army* or the Spanish *people* or the Spanish *provinces* what he expected to find them. With respect to the two latter, however, the people and the supplies, any one could have told him what the country afforded, and sir John Moore had told him what the people were made of. With regard to the *army* he could not so well judge. He must, after what he had heard of in the corps under Romana and Blake, have had his suspicions, and it became him to take care how he exposed an English army to the probable consequences of a reliance upon the co-operation of such associates. Yet, on the other hand, it was for him to judge, whether *the effect of English example upon so considerable a body of Spanish troops as that under Cuesta*, was not worth a trial, even at the risk of a lost battle. This appears to me to be the only ground of apology, or at least, of justification; and, I do not say, that, under similar circumstances, I should not have judged in favour of such risk. I am of opinion, indeed, that a great part of the public think, that, at bottom, the true

cause of the apprehended flight towards Cadiz, is, Wellesley's disappointment in the Spanish troops. Why not *say* this, then? Why disguise this fact, the knowledge of which removes, at once, all the doubts respecting the cause of inactivity after the battle, and of the precipitate retreat, which is said to have followed that inactivity? Why not declare openly a fact so necessary not only to the justification of our general, but to the reputation of our army?——The reason is, that the greater part of those, who have got hold of the public ear, wish to deceive that public in almost every thing; but, in nothing so much as in what relates to the disposition of the people and the armies of Spain, who, until the last verse of the last chapter, we are to be told, are ready to shed their blood for FERDINAND VII. In vain do facts, multitudes of facts, flatly contradict this assertion; in vain have we read the letters of sir John Moore; in vain have we seen whole corps run away from their commanders; in vain even now, in his Orders respecting this very battle, does CUESTA speak of his run-aways, and threaten to *decimate* them, when he catches them; that is to say, to put every tenth man of them to death: in vain do we see and hear all this; for we seem resolved to make no use of our senses, but still to believe the hirelings, who assure us, that the universal Spanish nation is "bent upon the "restoration of their beloved Ferdinand;" that the people, of all ranks and degrees, are *enthusiastic* in his cause; and, in short, that the nation will suffer itself to be butchered to the last man, rather than submit to the sway of Joseph Napoleon. This is what we are told to believe; and this is what *proofs* innumerable to the contrary do not make every one disbelieve. We have now before us our army in precipitate retreat; we know that they have left some hundreds of *missing;* and, what is still more to be lamented, that they have left some thousands of *wounded* and of *sick* to the mercy of those whom our hireling prints call "*Vandals,*" that is to say, *barbarians.* Yet, though we have this picture before our eyes; though we know that this exists in the heart of Spain, in the midst of a nation consisting of ten or twelve millions of people, still are there amongst us many thousands, who believe, or affect to believe, that the whole Spanish nation is enthusiastic in our cause, and that they hate and loath the French. There is no accounting for this but upon the principle of Burke: "let a man tell you his story every day "for a year, and, at the end of it, he "will be your master." These hireling prints tell their story every day; and at last, they, by mere dint of repeated assertion, get the better of the sense and the reason of their readers.——While my Lord Douro is retreating in one part of Spain, his brother, Lord Wellesley, is, the hireling prints tell us, making his diplomatic entry into another part of that devoted country, accompanied by another brother, Mr. Henry Wellesley. I believe there is a fourth brother, and would to God they were all in Spain; for, it has long been a saying about Whitehall and St. James's street, that nobody but the Wellesleys are capable of encountering the Buonapartés. Well, there are *three* of them in Spain. They have nothing to do but to draw upon the resources of England, and, unless their eulogists are liars, they have the universal Spanish nation on their side. There they are then, in the cabinet as well as in the field. They are fairly pitted against the Buonapartés, and we shall see, before many months have passed over our heads, which gains the day.——The Marquis, we are told in the London news-papers, stepped on shore, at Cadiz, *upon a French flag,* brought and spread out for the purpose. Whether this idea was borrowed from that of the bed of honour, which Marshal Vandome made for the king of France, or whether it be of Oriental origin, I know not; though I should rather suppose the latter; and, at any rate, it must be confessed, that there is in it something vastly manful, dignified, and sublime. The circumstance of *where* or *how,* the flag was obtained, whether it was taken from the French, during a desperate conflict on sea or land, whether it came from one of the French ships detained in the harbour of Cadiz, whether it was bought in a pawn-broker's shop, or, whether it was hooked off from some wall, where, under the name of bunting, it had kindly sheltered blossoms or fruits, the historical philosopher who narrates the occurrence has omitted to mention; but, he has told us, and it is a fact that I wish all the people in England to know and to bear in mind, that, when the Marquis Wellesley landed at Cadiz, a French flag was laid upon the ground, that he might walk over it, that he might trample it under foot, that he might *thus* triumph over Buonaparté. I wish this to be borne in mind by every man in England.——I sincerely hope that

neither of the three brothers will *come home*, till the contest is fairly at an end. I wish to see the thing *fought out* between them and the Buonapartés. They took to the war when it was in the most promising state. Napoleon was in Austria; only a handful, comparatively, of his army was left in Spain and Portugal; not yet even have any reinforcements been sent to his army; the Wellesleys have had an abundance of time to make all sorts of preparations; and, if they do not beat the Buonapartés, there will be left to them not the shadow of an excuse.——We have heard and read and seen enough of Lord Wellesley's Oriental wars. Some people were ill-natured enough to suppose, that these wars with the blacks were nothing. We shall now see what he will do against *white* men; and, for the honour of Old England, let us hope, that he will keep up his habits of triumph; for, really, it would be shocking to find, that when he came to be opposed to *whites*, he fell off in his career of glory. What would the Nabob Vizier of Oude say to that?—Well, come; let us leave them a while, and see what they will do; but, this I certainly shall do, whenever the result is known, make a comparison between the wars of the Wellesleys in Spain, and their wars in India.

It was my intention to have offered some remarks upon an article, which has been published in the Morning Chronicle, upon the subject of *depreciation of bank-notes*, that depreciation being now openly acknowledged to exist; but, I thought it my duty, before I proceeded to any other subject, to place upon record my opinions, relative to the battle of Talavera, and the extraordinary transactions connected with it.—— This Bank-Note work is going steadily on, and so it ought; but, I can remember when I was accused of a wish to overthrow the government, because I insisted, that bank-notes had depreciated. They have, it would appear from this article, now depreciated nearly 20 per cent., and this is stated, too, in the public prints, to which I will add, that I am very far from thinking the depreciation an unpromising sign for the country. The bank notes *are the funds*, and the funds *are the bank notes*. It is a pleasant concern altogether; but it is what I feel no interest in, and what, if annihilated to-morrow before breakfast-time, would not at all endanger the safety of England. This being my opinion, the author of the article in question must excuse me if I smile at his *alarms*, and especially at his *remedies*. No, no: for a paper currency, once debased, to be restored to credit, is as impossible as for honesty to work its way into the heart of a pettifogger, bred to the forging of wills, and the tutoring of false witnesses.

WM. COBBETT.

Botley, Thursday, 31st August 1809.

MR. TOWNSEND ON TYTHES.

Busbridge, Aug. 20, 1809.

Sir; Your Political Register of yesterday is now before me, and as you are the last man in the world by whom I would wish any thing that was said or written by me to be misunderstood, your observations on my Letter concerning the Godalmin Tythes, (to use your own words) "demand an answer." So, indeed, do your questions concerning Sir Arthur Wellesley's dispatches, and I wish the one may be answered as satisfactorily as I trust I shall answer the other. But, before I enter on the subject of the Tythes, I must tell you, Sir, that I take an uncommon degree of interest in every thing that comes from your pen; for we often think alike, and upon some occasions, I have found the opinions published in your Register, correspond exactly with those I had in private expressed: which was the case in regard to the late dispatches from Sir Arthur Wellesley. For my friends know that I had made every observation respecting them, which in yesterday's Register was made by you: particularly the misunderstanding which the dispatches were likely to produce betwixt the Spaniards and us. When one feels that a man really loves his country, when one knows that in consequence, he is deservedly looked up to by that country, one must be anxious that he should upon all occasions view things in the right light. For if he sees things through a false medium, let his intentions be ever so good, he would never be able to apply a remedy to the existing evil; and he would be sure to split on the rock, on which so many have struck before.—I will confess to you, Sir, that your Summary of Politics, which I have read to day, has relieved me from some alarm, by convincing me that the "zeal" you feel for the public cause, will be directed in the proper way. Yes, Sir, it is the "Medécin malgré-lui, it is a "stupid way of thinking received and en- "couraged by certain hireling writers on "the continent, (and you might have

added in this country) that has been the "great cause of our public disasters," and I agree with you that "In spite of long "and woeful experience, it appears to me "at this hour as efficient as ever." And I also agree with you that "The public, "who have been so often deceived, will "bear yet a great deal more in the way "of deception: and that those who at"tempt to undeceive them in time, must "expect to bear yet a great deal more in "the way of reproach." To bear a share of that reproach I am most willing, and for no other reward than the satisfaction of handing down to my son, unsullied, that character for political disinterestedness, and integrity, which my father bequeathed to me. And I trust, by seeing a good example, my son will never prostitute those abilities, his schoolmaster tells me he possesses, to the destruction of that rational liberty, which Englishmen ought at all times to be ready with their lives to defend, and against which no Englishman either abroad or at home ever ought to lift up his hand.—And now, Sir, after so long a digression, I must return to the dull subject of Tythes, respecting which you have quite misunderstood me; for I had not the most distant idea of abolishing Tythes altogether; I might as well have thought of abolishing Taxes altogether; both the one and the other, if kept within due bounds, and properly applied, (to use the words of that distinguished Patriot, Sir Francis Burdett) when collected, would descend like the dews of Heaven to occasion a general benefit.—Now, Sir, I fancy the words that gave you an idea that I wished for the abolition of Tythes were these: "The present system of taxing "and tything, if persevered in, will in a "short time prevent the farmer from sell"ing his corn, except at a price, as I have "observed before, which none but the "affluent can afford to pay." Now, Sir, what I meant by the present or immediate system was this; the Tythe-valuer came to me, and told me that the weight of the taxes, and dearness of the times, obliged his employer to raise the Tythes. He did not know what the present system might lead to, but that whilst the price of corn *kept up*, he thought I could afford to pay 50*l.* per year. Now, Sir, my object was to *lower*, not to keep up the price of corn, and that, I assure you, entirely upon patriotic, not selfish, feelings. I then, Sir, began to consider, where is this race betwixt the government, rector, and farmer to end. The government lays on taxes, the rector raises the tythes, the farmer the price of corn; but what is to become of the public at large? and what remedy can be applied to the frightful prospect that now presents itself to my mind?—A Parliamentary Reform—*that* may put a stop to the shameful profusion of the public money which has existed for the last sixteen years! If the public money were properly managed, thought I, the taxes might be reduced, and then there would not be a necessity for the parson's raising his tythes, or the farmer the price of corn. But as a Parliamentary Reform might be a long time in taking place, if it ever took place at all, I proceeded to consider, whether there might not be some act, some regulation respecting Tythes, that might be immediately applied to, for the purpose of keeping down the farmer's outgoings, and therefore the price of corn. In searching the Statutes at large, I found an Act that particularly applied to my case, and which I now transcribe for your perusal. It is a statute enacted 15 Ric. II. c. 6, and which was renewed and enforced by Statute 4 Hen. IV. c. 12.

"In *appropriation* of Benefices there "shall be provision made for the "*Poor*, and the Vicar.

"Item, because divers damages, and "hindrances oftentimes have happened, "and daily do happen to the parishioners "of divers places, by the appropriation "of Benefices of the same places; it is "agreed and assented, that in every li"cence from henceforth to be made in the "Chancery of the appropriation of any "parish Church, it shall be expressly con"tained and comprised that the diocesan "of the place, upon the appropriation of "such churches, shall ordain according to "the value of such churches a convenient "sum of money to be paid and distributed "yearly, of the fruits and profits of the "same churches, by those that shall have "the said churches in proper use, and by "their successors, to the poor parishioners "of the said churches, in aid of their liv"ing and sustenance for ever; and also "that the vicar be well and sufficiently "endowed."

Now, Sir, I trust I have convinced you, that the raising of the Tythes at Godalmin, *has* to do with Parliamentary Reform, for I have no doubt that the same rise of Tythes, and the same reason for raising them, (that is, the weight of the taxes) goes from one end of the kingdom

to the other; and I cannot help repeating that it is my opinion if we were properly represented in Parliament, which can only be by means of a Parliamentary Reform, that some salutary regulation, some modification would be adopted in respect to Tythes; as the present mode of taking them in kind, is a complete bar to the cultivation of a great deal of poor, waste ground, and often most shocking to humanity. I was lately in Essex, where the parson having some Glebe land, would not come to any composition with his parishioners, except for the small Tythes, and those, the farmer and his wife told me, they compounded for at an enormous price, for that they could not bear the moaning of the calves, when deprived of every tenth meal of milk.—As my only object in addressing you was to explain my reasons for connecting the rise of the Godalmin Tythes with a Reform of Parliament, I shall abstain from entering into your arguments at lengh, but in justice to myself I must observe, that I never meant to complain of the highway rate, or the rise in labourers wages, but to shew the various outgoings on a farm, some necessary and unavoidable; and that therefore any unnecessary burthen should not be laid on the farmer, as it must inevitably produce a rise in the price of corn, and thereby materially affect the public good. You would oblige me by giving my letter a place in your Register, as I shall think it necessary to send a copy of this defence of my conduct, to those who had my letter concerning the Tythes.

I am, Sir,
Your obedient servant
and sincere admirer
HENRY HARE TOWNSEND.

PROCEEDINGS of a SPECIAL COURT of COMMON COUNCIL of the CITY of LONDON. Held in consequence of a Notice of a MOTION given by Mr. JAMES DIXON, to RESCIND the VOTE of THANKS to Col. WARDLE, passed on the 6th of April last.—*(Continued from p. 223.)*

[Mr. Waithman, *in continuation.*]

But it has been asked, with an air of triumph over Mr. Wardle, how he comes to complain of corruption in the Sale of Seats in the House of Commons?—Whether he did not purchase his own seat there? To which I answer, I do not know how that fact stands; but this I know, that Mr. Wardle, like any other individual, has a right to shift for himself in that respect, while the market, I say, while the market remains open. I have had fifty seats offered to myself in that assembly, upon certain terms: the very individual who is stated to have negociated that concern under my lord Sligo, told me he would procure me a seat, if I would procure for him a writership under the East India Company. These are indeed abuses, and they are monstrous abuses, but they are only few of the abuses under which this country labours, and which bear hard on the honest part of the community in which we live. Since they have been proved to exist; since they are admitted to exist, and are avowed by those who feed upon them, will any man lay his hand upon his heart, and say those things ought to continue; or say, that he who exposes them is unworthy of the thanks of the public. Will any man say that a great saving may not be made in the public expenditure of this country, by the introduction of a little more common honesty into some of the departments of the state? I believe what Mr. Wardle has said upon that subject, that the savings would be very nearly to the amount of the Income Tax.

Mr. TADDY admitted that others had known, and had talked of "abuses," but nobody had acted so efficiently towards their prevention, as well as Mr. Wardle, and therefore that gentleman was a very fit subject for the thanks of the public.

Mr. Alderman ATKINS wished the Resolution of the worthy Alderman to be withdrawn, because it embraced matter for the discussion of which the Court was not convened. He had no idea of rescinding the Vote of Thanks to Mr. Wardle, for nothing could be more unjust to that gentleman, than to condemn him before he has been heard. Mr. Wardle, said the worthy Alderman, has committed himself to the public over and over again, that he will prove that the matter which has been stated to his prejudice, and upon which the verdict of a jury has been obtained against him, has been the effect of perjury. Until that be ascertained, we should suspend our judgments; meanwhile, do not let us withdraw from Mr. Wardle the Thanks we have given to him for his exertions in the service of the public. That would be treating ourselves, as well as Mr. Wardle, unhandsomely. If we had been unfortunate enough to place our esteem or bestow our bounty upon an unworthy object, that might be reason why

e might regret our mistake, without being reason for our retracting the donation. I herefore wish, by all means, that we should ot rescind the Vote of Thanks which we ave passed in favour of Mr. Wardle; ut I cannot help recommending, most rongly, to the worthy Alderman to with-raw his proposition, because it embraces atter, for the discussion of which we were ot, this day, convened; it tends to cast, nnecessarily for the present purpose at east, reflections on his majesty's ministers. We are now called upon to vote charges gainst persons who have not been heard pon them before us; charges upon which e ourselves have had no time for consi-eration. We are called upon to come to conclusion before we have had time to eliberate upon a great deal of criminating atter. Surely we should pause before e come to such a conclusion: speaking or myself, I have no hesitation in con-essing that my ability is not equal to the sk of proceeding with that celerity which proposed by this Resolution, to censure n the mass ministers who have not been eard before us. Besides, it is not the purpose for which this Court is professedly ssembled; we did not come here to-day, o pronounce philippics upon the king's inisters, but to consider the propriety or he impropriety of rescinding our own ote respecting an individual. And now e are called upon, by a side wind, to ote quite another matter. Indeed, my Lord Mayor, I cannot help asking, whe-her this is not a trap laid to catch the otes of gentlemen who were not aware of t? This seems to me to be running riot with things. I am ready to say, that the Vote of Thanks to Mr. Wardle ought not o be rescinded on account of any thing hat has yet transpired; but I cannot as-ent to the proposition which goes the length of extending our thanks to that gentleman on account of his statement in he House of Commons, of matter in which here may be a saving in the public ex-penditure, because that matter is not, at present, before us, nor does it follow that every saving is economy. If you dimi-nish your establishment, you may dimi-nish your expence; but it does not thence necessarily follow that you improve your condition. If I put down my carriage, which, as far as regards myself, I might do, because, thank God, I can walk, I might save some expence, but I do not think it would improve the condition of my family; and so it may be with some parts of the expenditure of this country, the particulars of which I am not now dis-cussing; they are topics which we are not called upon to discuss; and the Court will pardon me if I doubt its competence to such a discussion. The great objection I have to it is, that we were not brought here for this purpose; if we pass this Resolution, it will appear to the public that we were brought together for one purpose, and have been entrapped into another. I came here to enter my protest against rescinding the Vote of Thanks to Mr. Wardle, but I must likewise protest against the Resolution now proposed.

Mr. Clark admitted that the Vote of Thanks to Mr. Wardle ought not to be shaken, but thought the present Resolu-tion went to approve of the whole of his subsequent conduct, a proposition to which he did not assent, and therefore wished it to be withdrawn.

Mr. Miller said, that taking the whole of the conduct of Mr. Wardle subsequent to the Vote of Thanks of this Court to him, in the light of debtor and creditor with the public, there was a very large balance in favour of that gentleman.

Mr. Mawman contended that this Reso-lution was such as ought not to be sanc-tioned by this Corporation under the pre-sent circumstances. He never would give his support to a Resolution so drawn; the sense he had of the dignity of the Corpo-ration; the regard he had for his own in-dividual character, forbade his assent to it. He objected to the manner in which it was brought forward; it came by surprize; notice should have been given of it man-fully, that the Court might have been convened for the purpose of discussing it; this was indirect and insidious; he must protest against it as an individual.

Mr. Alderman Goodbehere said, that the general opinion was now manifest as to the Vote of Thanks passed in favour of Mr. Wardle; that such Vote ought not to be rescinded; but, said the worthy Alderman, I have assigned reasons to this Court for thinking that it has not gone the whole length which it ought to go in favour of Mr. Wardle, for I have stated facts to the credit of Mr. Wardle, which he stated in the House of Commons to the advantage of the public, which have been verified by subsequent events, and from his conduct on that occasion, several bene-ficial alterations have already taken place, and the consideration of which, I say, calls on us to mark his conduct with additional

approbation. [Bravo, bravo! Silence, silence!] I must, therefore, persist in my Amendment, notwithstanding the discouragement of my worthy friend upon the floor (Mr. Mawman); I esteem his friendship highly, and I should wish to court his assistance. He would, at any time, be a very useful auxiliary to any one whose measure he should be pleased to espouse; but if I cannot have his valuable aid, I must go on as well as I am able, without it; and he must allow me to differ from him in opinion upon the present occasion, and to say, that it is my privilege to decide on what course I shall take now, without dictation from any quarter, however respectable that may be; and I am so well convinced of the propriety of what I now offer, that I not only trust the Court will adopt it, but I persuade myself, that if I had the pleasure of meeting that worthy member, and of discussing this matter with him in private, I should have obtained his assent to it. [No, no, said Mr. Mawman.] Mr. Alderman Goodbehere proceeded—I still retain my opinion; for I know his feelings, and I know how grateful he is to those who serve the public, and we all know that gratitude in good men is a feeling that will not bear compression; it is of spontaneous growth as well as of expansive nature, and delights in exercise. Then would my worthy friend wish to check its growth, or destroy its lustre? No. There is a beauty in deserved praise, which I am confident my worthy friend would not diminish, and yet he now appears to wish to do away the effect of those praises which Mr. Wardle has so well deserved, and this would have a very unfavourable effect on the minds of those who are not much in the habit of thinking for themselves, unless we took care to counteract it; I say, then, that Mr. Wardle stands in a situation peculiar to himself; that he came forward, and, for a while, stood alone; had no party, and hardly an individual to support him, in his endeavour to expose corruption in the management of our public affairs. I say that he has had no other reward for all his labours, successful as they were, than the approbation and esteem of the public. He has had neither place nor pension, nor the reversion, nor the promise of a reversion, of place or pension. He therefore stands before us with peculiar claims to our countenance and support; he has indeed high claims, not only on our generosity, but on our justice; let us encourage him to perseverance in his object. I therefore, with that view, shall persist in recommending my proposition to the adoption of this Court. — Here the worthy Alderman's Amendment was read by the Recorder, as already stated.

Mr. Mawman then expressed his astonishment that the worthy Alderman persisted in what appeared to him (and, he hoped, to the Court) a very extraordinary course of proceeding. All that he had left to do, with a view of counteracting it, was to move an Amendment upon this Resolution, which was to move, that after the word "That," all be left out, and the following be inserted in their stead:—"This Court doth not see any reason for rescinding the Vote, passed on the 6th of April last, of Thanks and Gratitude to Gwyllym Lloyd Wardle, esq."

Mr. Samuel Dixon said, that this Amendment was so plain, that the meanest capacity in the Court must understand it, and it had his assent in preference to that which it was its object to supersede; a proposition so long, so complex, so bewildered, such a farrago, that he doubted whether any body understood it thoroughly; and, at the same time, foreign to the avowed purpose for which the Court met. The purpose for which the Members of the Corporation came together was, to see whether there was, or was not, ground for rescinding the Vote of Thanks to Mr. Wardle; and this proposition was, under pretence of an Amendment to another proposition, to censure the whole of the Administration of the Country under the head of a string of assertions, unconnected with the avowed purpose of the Court.

Mr. Waithman said, that the last Amendment, under pretence of confining the Court to the purpose of its Meeting, was much more deserving of the title of a trap than the proposition of his worthy friend, Mr. Ald. Goodbehere, for the real purpose of the Meeting of the Court was, to canvass the conduct of Mr. Wardle since the Vote of Thanks. The Court had done so, and it appeared, in the course of that inquiry, upon a recital of facts, that such conduct had been highly meritorious and beneficial to the public; and the tendency of the Resolution was to express that feeling. The tendency of the Amendment was, to prevent that justice being done to Mr. Wardle, under pretence of friendship to him. I have often been charged, said he, with being a party man, but now I am

charged with being of no party. Thus it is that we have seen party men make a noise about corruption, until they can create discontent enough in the Public to turn out an Administration, and get themselves into it, and then they are contented, while the people are no better off than before; but if you attack Corruption itself, instead of only attacking those who feed upon it, then you have all parties upon your back, because you are destroying their food. Thus have I met my friend (Mr. Mawman) at the Whig Club (for it is not every member of the Whig Club that is a Whig, believe me)—I am a Whig certainly; I was taught in the Whig School principles which seated his Majesty's illustrious House upon the Throne of these realms. But I have met men at the Whig Club, who came there to follow Charles Fox, and would follow any Fox, if they thought they would get any thing by it; but who would not follow you an inch on the road to destroy corruption itself, although they would cry out against the thing, for the sake of turning out those who profited by it, and get in themselves. Nay, they would oppose you, as they do sometimes in the House of Commons, with professed friendship and real hatred, by the trick of an amendment upon your amendment. I care not for these half-and-half men; nay, I dislike them more, because more ungenerous than an open enemy.—[Burst of applause.]

Mr. Alderman Wood did not scruple to say that Mr. Wardle had actually saved this country, and it was impossible sufficiently to repay him; but for Mr. Wardle's exertions, the Duke of York would have been, at this moment, Commander in Chief, and at the head of the Expedition! and then!—I say, said the worthy Alderman, Mr. Wardle has saved this country.

Mr. Mawman had no hesitation in saying that the present Administration ought to be changed; but he saw great danger in telling the people that they were to look for no good from any other party, because it was, in effect, telling the people that they ought to take the government into their own hands. Who, and what was Mr. Wardle, that he should be looked up to as the only human being who could save this country? He saw in him no such transcendant virtue.

Mr. Waithman contended for the propriety of inculcating in the minds of the people, this maxim, That they are not to look for any advantage by a change of men: That there must be a change of system. This was the doctrine of Mr. Fox himself; doctrine founded in true wisdom, and which, thank Heaven! was gaining ground every day; doctrine once maintained, even by Mr. Pitt.

The question was then put, and declared by the Lord Mayor, upon a shew of hands, to have been carried in favour of Mr. Mawman's Amendment; but, on a division, the numbers were—For the Amendment, 1 Alderman, 51 Commoners, 2 Tellers—54. For Ald. Goodbehere's Resolutions, 3 Aldermen, 54 Commoners, 2 Tellers—59.—Majority, 5.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

Austrian Official Account of the Battle of Wagram, (no date.)

By the 4th, the enemy had completed the new bridge from the Isle of Lobau across a branch of the Danube, in which he was much favoured both by the ground and by an immense number of artillery. The imperial and royal army was drawn up on the eminence behind the rivulet Russ, extending its right wing beyond Sussessbrun and Kagran, and its left beyond Markgrafen-Neusiedel. The centre was posted near Wagram. The enemy having, in the night between the 4th and 5th, crossed over to the left bank of the Danube, large masses appeared very early in the morning, in the plain. Not long before noon he attacked the line of the imperial and royal army in all its points. But his greatest exertions were directed against the centre, probably with a view of forcing it.—His attacks, though repeated with the greatest impetuosity, and supported by an immense number of ordnance, among which were many batteries of the heaviest calibre, proved this day abortive.—The firing ceased at ten o'clock at night. The imperial and royal army had, on the whole of its line, maintained its positions, and made a considerable number of prisoners, among whom there are many Saxon, Badenese, Italian, and Portuguese soldiers. —On the 6th, in the morning, at four o'clock, the enemy renewed his attacks with still larger masses, and greater impetuosity than on the preceding day. Even thus his efforts against the centre and the right wing were attended with so little success, that the latter had even gained such advantages as to justify the

expectation of the completest victory, when the enemy, with fresh divisions and great superiority, suddenly penetrated the left wing near Markgrafen-Neusiedel, and succeeded, after an obstinate engagement, in compelling it to retreat. One of the wings of the royal and imperial army being thereby exposed, his imperial and royal highness the Archduke and Generalissimo has directed the retreat by the way of Stammersdorf and the Bisamhill, in consequence of which the army occupies a new position, covering the communication with Bohemia. This retreat was made good in the best order and without material loss. In the centre, as well as in the right wing, the enemy suffered very considerably. Six thousand prisoners were taken from him, among whom are three generals. He likewise lost twelve cannon, with ammunition, and was in every respect so much weakened, that he has not attempted since to pursue the imperial and royal army further. Gen. Lasalle is among his dead. —The imperial and royal army has also to lament a great loss. In gen. Nordmann it has been deprived of a very eminent officer. Generals Peter Vecsai, D'Aspre, and Vukassiovitz, are without hopes of recovery. Generals prince of Hesse-Homburgh, Stutterheim, and Paar, are less severely wounded. His imperial highness the Generalissimo himself, and prince Lichtenstein, received slight musket-wounds, which, however, will not be attended with any dangerous consequences. It remains to be observed, that the whole army has again afforded such proofs of courage and perseverance, as not to cloud our future prospects with any future apprehensions.

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To such Gentlemen as may happen to be in possession of curious Trials, or of documents relating to Trials of the description of those to be contained in this Work, I shall be much obliged for a communication of them. If the document, or paper, whether in print or manuscript, be requested to be preserved, great care shall be taken of it.

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